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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The parties named in the Second Amended Complaint are Leigh Young a/k/a Hardy 
(Plaintiff) and Fire Insurance Exchange (Defendant). As such, the caption of the case on appeal 
accurately reflects the names of all parties to this appeal 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over Leigh Hardy's (Plaintiff) appeal from the grant of the 
Directed Verdict in favor of Fire Insurance Exchange (Defendant) and the denial of Plaintiff s 
Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code Annotated. Notice of 
Appeal from the grant of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing the bad 
faith claim has not been provided, depriving this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over this 
issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Does the failure of Plaintiff to designate on the Notice of Appeal an appeal from 
the grant of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing the bad faith 
claim deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the issue? 
(a) If the Court finds that the Notice of Appeal was sufficient, then was the dismissal 
of Plaintiff s claim for bad faith on partial summary judgment supported by the 
record? (Plaintiffs Argument L) 
Standard of Review: The Court "view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party]." State Farm Mutual 
Auto Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97 (Utah 2003.) 
Preservation for Review: This issue was not designated in the Notice of Appeal. If the 
Court finds the Notice of Appeal is sufficient, then this issue was preserved by 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Opposition to that Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendant's Reply, and the Court's Order granting partial 
summary judgment. (R.173-418; R.509-593; R.891-924; R.934-941; R.1296-1297.) 
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Issue: Did the trial court rule correctly in granting Defendant's Motion for a Directed 
Verdict? (Plaintiffs Argument VH.) 
(a) Does Plaintiff have the burden of proving that her loss is a covered loss under the 
policy (was accidental) before the burden shifts to the Defendant to raise any 
exclusion as an affirmative defense? (Plaintiffs Argument HI.) 
(b) Does Plaintiff have the burden of putting on expert testimony to show that the fire 
was accidentally set? (Plaintiffs Argument IV.) 
(c) Was it appropriate for Defendant to make its Motion for Directed Verdict at the 
close of its case? (Plaintiffs Argument VIE.) 
(i) By proceeding with its case, did Defendant waive its right to move for a 
Directed Verdict?1 (Plaintiffs Argument VI.) 
(d) Did the trial court err in granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? (Plaintiffs 
Argument IX.) 
Standard of Review: 
Issue 2: "A trial court is justified in granting a directed verdict only if, examining 
all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no competent 
evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor." Carlson 
Distributing Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C., 95 P.3d 1171 (Utah App. 2004). 
1
 This issue was not preserved for review. 
2 
Issues 2(a). 2(b), 2(c). 2(c)(i). 2(d): The trial court's ruling is reviewed under a 
correctness standard. Handy v. Union Pacific R. Co., 841 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah App. 
1992.) 
Preservation for Review: The above issues, with the exception of 2(c)(i) (waiver), are 
preserved for review by the grant of Defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict. Issue 
2(c)(i) was never preserved for review. (R.l 188-1190; R.1209-1210; R.1221-1225; 
R.1226-1233; R.1238-1250; R.1251-1274; R.1291-1294; R.1304:98:13-25; 99:1-3; 
R.1305:176:18-21; 183:14-21; R.1311:3-8.) 
3. Issue: Did the trial court wrongfully exclude Plaintiffs rebuttal witness from testifying in 
her "case-in-chief?" (Plaintiffs Argument H) 
(a) Should Plaintiffs rebuttal witness have been allowed to testify at the close of 
Defendant's case? (Plaintiffs Argument V.) 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit expert testimony is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999); Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). 
Preservation for Review: These issues were preserved for review at the time of the trial 
and the court's ruling granting Defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict. (R.l305: 
172:1-2; 253:10-12,18-20, 22-23; 254:1-8, 13-15; R.1311:3-8.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
Defendant cites to the following: (1) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9); 
(2) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3(d); (3) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(b); 
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(4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50(a); and (5) Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a) (see 
Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case/ Course of Proceedings. 
This claim arises out of a July 26,2001 fire at Plaintiffs home. As a result of that fire, 
Plaintiff filed a claim for structural damages and for damage to her personal property. Because it 
was thought the fire was intentionally set by or at the direction of Plaintiff, the claim was denied. 
Plaintiff then filed a Second Amended Complaint for breach of contract and bad faith. (R.l 1-15; 
R. Ex. 16.) 
At the close of discovery, Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
bad faith claim arguing that this claim was "fairly debatable" and that it was entitled to partial 
summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion, and Defendant filed a 
Reply. The trial court granted Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing the 
bad faith claim, finding that Plaintiffs claim was in fact "fairly debatable." (R.173-418; R.509-
593;R.891-924;R.934-941.) 
Simultaneously with Defendant filing its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [sic] on the breach of contract claim, Defendant filed an 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion, and Plaintiff filed a Reply. The trial court denied Plaintiffs 
Motion, finding that there were issues of fact for the jury. (R.419-421; R.422-508; R.594-818; 
R.822-890;R.934-941.) 
The breach of contract claim was set for jury trial beginning November 28, 2006. On 
November 30, 2006, at the conclusion of Plaintiff s case and, after putting on its case at the trial 
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court's request, Defendant made a Motion for Directed Verdict, which the trial court granted. In 
granting that Motion for Directed Verdict, the trial court determined that Plaintiff had not 
sustained her burden of showing she was wrongfully denied insurance coverage, or that the fire 
was accidentally set. As such, Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict was granted. 
On January 2, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial. That Motion for a New Trial 
was denied on February 28, 2007. This appeal followed, specifically appealing from the grant of 
the Directed Verdict and the denial of the Motion for a New Trial.2 (R.l 188-1190; R.1209-1210; 
R.1221-1225; R.1226-1233; R.1238-1250; R.1251-1274; R.1291-1294; R.1311:3-8.) 
B. Statement of Facts 
L Facts Relating to Both the Bad Faith Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and the Directed Verdict 
(a) Background Information 
On July 26, 2001, a fire occurred in the southeast [sic, northeast] basement bedroom of the 
home (9950 South Marble Street) owned by Plaintiff. As a result of that fire, Plaintiff claimed 
structural damage in the amount of $123,750 and for personal property in the amount of $74,250.3 
(R.180 f l ; R.1304:17:19-20; 22:22-25; 23:1,20-23; 45:24-25; 46:9-14.) That same day, 
Plaintiffs husband, Douglas Young, filed a claim with Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange for 
this loss. (R. 1304:37:1-2; R.180 f2.) The home was insured by Defendant under Policy No. 
06092-23-87, which the parties agreed was in effect at the time of the loss. (R. 1304:23:8-25; 
2
 Plaintiff has not briefed the appeal from the denial of a new trial and has therefore waived the 
right to do so. 
3
 The total amount of damages to the contents was approximately $145,000. However, Plaintiff 
only filed a claim for the policy limits of $74,250. 
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24:1; R.180 %3; R. Ex. 4) That policy contains specific provisions excluding coverage for 
intentional acts, fraud and misrepresentation. 
SECTION I - CONDITIONS 
11. Intentional Acts, If any insured directly causes or arranges for a loss to 
covered property in order to obtain insurance benefits, this policy is void. 
We will not pay you or any other insured for this loss. 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
Applying To The Entire Policy 
3, Concealment or Fraud. This entire policy is void if any insured has 
knowingly and willfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or 
circumstance relating to this insurance before or after the loss. 
(4th Edition Your Protector Plus Policy, Utah, pp. 14, 18.) (R.1801{4; R. Ex.4.) 
At the time of the fire, Plaintiff was married to Douglas Young, whom she had married 
twice - the first time on April 15,2001, and again on August 18, 2001. Family and friends were 
only aware ofthe August 18, 2001 marriage. (R. 1304:61:3-7, 11-16, 62:1-6; R.181 f5.) Shortly 
after this fire, Mr. Young was incarcerated and is still in the federal penitentiary. (R. 1304:75:14-
16; R.182 f9.) Prior to marrying Mr. Young, Plaintiff was married to Brad Hardy (they were 
divorced in March of 2001). (R.1304:18:13-16, 21-22; 19:4-5; R.181 \6\ R. Ex.1.) 
Plaintiff has three children: David Elliott, Tim Hardy and Breigh Hardy. David Elliott 
(Shawn) was incarcerated at the time ofthe fire. (R: 1304:73:1-2; R.181 f7.) Tim Hardy lived 
with Plaintiff in August or September of 2000 and then moved to Idaho to live with his father. At 
the time ofthe fire, he was visiting his mother, but staying at a friend's house. (R.1304:14:9-16; 
72:16-23; R.181 f 7(b).) Breigh Hardy was the only child living in the home at the time ofthe 
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fire. However, the week of the fire, she was with her father in Idaho. (R. 1304:72:24-25; R.182 
17(c).) 
At the time of their divorce in March of 2001, Brad Hardy was earning $2,600 per month. 
(R. 1304:60:7-20.) As part of the March, 2001 divorce settlement, Brad Hardy quit-claimed the 
home to Plaintiff, and also agreed to pay the mortgage on the home in the amount of $696 per 
month in lieu of alimony and child support. At the time of the fire, Plaintiff was the sole owner of 
the home. (R. 1304:19:2-5; 20:14,17-20; 64:10-16; 82:25; 83:1-4; R.182 f 8.) 
Since 1999, and at the time of the fire, other than payment of the mortgage on the home as 
per the divorce decree, Plaintiffs only source of income was her Social Security/ Disability 
benefits in the amount of $300 per month. (R. 1304:60:11-20; R.182 f 10; R. Ex.1.) Further, at 
the time of the fire, both she and her ex-husband, Brad Hardy, had outstanding tax liens and 
medical bills, and several judgments against them. (R. 1304:65:10-19; R. 183 f 11.) After the fire, 
when she sold the home for approximately $67,000, she used part of that money to pay off the tax 
liens, including those of Brad Hardy. (R. 1304:53:20-25; R.183 f 11.) 
(b) Pre-Fire Events 
On July 13, 2001, approximately ten days prior to the fire, officers from the Sandy City 
Police Department were called to the home at 2:30 a.m. to investigate possible domestic abuse. 
(R.1304:66:16-19; 67:11-25; 68:1-4, 23-25; 69:1-6, R.183 f 13; R. Ex.39.) When they arrived at 
the home, Breigh Hardy (13 years old) was very reluctant to let the officers into the home, stating 
"Our house is really messy," and "I don't want you to take me away because of my house." 
(R.183 fl4;R. Ex.39.) 
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The officers described the house as having a pungent odor of cat urine and feces that was 
almost unbearable. The home had almost no furniture. There was a mattress on the living room 
floor with dirty blankets spread out. Dirty clothes were all throughout the house, with cats 
sleeping on some of them. The walls were badly damaged and the entire house was disorderly. 
The two back bedrooms on the main floor had about three feet of dirty clothes and other 
miscellaneous items covering the entire floor. There was no walking space in the bedrooms, and 
there was a strong fecal odor. The mess from the bedrooms spilled out covering half the main 
hallway in the home. The kitchen had rotten food on the counters and the floor. The bathroom 
toilet had brown water in the bowl and may not have been working. There was very little room to 
move about the house because of the dirty clothing. The driveway contained two vehicles packed 
full Of miscellaneous items that appeared to have been parked in the same place for a long period 
of time. The yard was unkempt with tall, brown weeds. (R.183: f 15; R. Ex.39.) 
Because of the condition of the home and the concern about the minor child, the officers 
faxed their July 13, 2001 report to Craig Weinheimer of the Salt Lake County Board of Health. 
(R.1305:185:12-21; 186:17-25; 187:1; R.1841J16; R. Ex.39.) After reviewing this report, Mr. 
Weinheimer became concerned with the officers' description of the home and also of potential 
code violations. (R. 1305:187:24-25; 188:1-8, R.184 f 16; R. Ex.39.) Mr. Weinheimer attempted, 
on numerous occasions, to meet with Ms. Hardy. The first time he went to the Hardy home was 
on Friday, July 20, 2001. When he arrived, the front door was open and he could see inside the 
Hardy home. He noted the stairs were just bare wood with no floor coverings. There were many 
items stacked about. The house was cluttered with items and was generally in disrepair and 
unkempt. He also noted that the house had the very distinct odor of animal waste and rotting 
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garbage. (R.1305:188:14-25; 189:1-10; R.184 f 16; R. Ex.39.) At that time, Ms. Hardy was 
leaving and she requested he return on Monday, advising him the house "will be just as bad on 
Monday." (R.1305:190:3-15; R.1841J16; R. Ex.39.) 
On Monday, July 23, 2001, Mr. Weinheimer telephoned Ms. Hardy, prior to going to the 
home, to confirm the inspection and expressed his concerns regarding the seriousness of the 
problem. A meeting was set for Wednesday, July 25, 2001 to inspect the premises. (R.1305: 
189:18-25; R.184 lfl7.) As scheduled, Mr. Weinheimer went to the home on July 25, 2001, but 
nobody was home. Later that afternoon, he telephoned Ms. Hardy and advised her that this was a 
very serious matter and that "we need to conclude our business on Thursday or I may be required 
to close the home to occupancy without actually inspecting the property." (R. 1305: 191:11 -22; 
R. 184 f 18.) A meeting was set for July 26, 2001 at 11:00 a,m. The fire was reported at 6:55 a.m. 
that very day, just prior to that meeting. (R.1305:193:2-5; R.184 f 18.) Regardless, he was of the 
opinion, after observing the home through the front door, that" . . . the burden of proof had been 
met, and that it wasn't fit to be occupied." (R.1305:192:2-5; R.185 f 19.) 
Ms. Hardy claims that from July 21, 2001 through the morning of July 26, 2001, she was 
staying at the Travel Lodge with Doug Young. Breigh was with her father in Idaho, and Tim was 
at his friend's home. (R.1304:25:16-17; 26:1-12; R.185 f20; R. Ex.37.) 
Two days prior to the fire, on July 24,2001, Ms. Hardy claims that she, Doug Young, Tim 
Hardy and Tim's friend, Matt, went to Lagoon, where they remained until about midnight. The 
last time she claims that she and Doug were in the home was when they went back to the house on 
July 25, 2001 at approximately 1:30 a.m. to make sure the lights were on in the front room and the 
swamp cooler was on, as well as the oscillating fan in the room of origin. (R. 1304:25:4-22; 74:5-
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19; R.185 1J21, 22, 23.) Plaintiff denied being at the home anytime on July 26, 2001, just prior to 
this fire, even though she told Mr. Beebe, the Defendant's claims respresentative, she was in the 
home on July 26, 2001 between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m. (R.1304:104:5-12, 20-21; 105:6-10; 
R. 1305:205:10-11; R.1861[24; R.1931139(b); R. Ex.37.) This was confirmed by a neighbor, Steve 
Johnson, who noted that Doug Young's vehicle was parked at the home between midnight and 
2:00 a.m. on July 26, 2001. (R.190 f30(c); R. Ex.37.) 
The fire occurred on July 26, 2001, and was reported at approximately 6:55 a.m. when it 
was first noticed. Plaintiff and Mr. Young were at the Travel Lodge and were not notified of the 
fire until 8:30 a.m. by her son Shawn's friend, Kelly. By the time she arrived, the fire had been 
contained. (R.1304:35:21-25; 36:1-2; R.186 f25.) 
(c) Post-Fire Events 
The Sandy City Fire Marshall, Richard Lyman, was one of the parties called to the scene 
of the fire and was there at approximately 7:00 a.m. on the morning of the fire to do a cause and 
origin investigation (he was a city employee, not Defendant's cause and origin expert.) (R.1305: 
203:17-18; 204:15-17; R.1861f26; R. Ex.37.) He began investigating the fire by inspecting and 
photographing the scene and interviewing various witnesses to determine the cause and origin of 
the fire. After speaking to the various witnesses, Mr. Lyman learned: (1) none of the occupants 
were home at the time of the fire (R. 1305:205:11; R.187 K26(a)); (2) Steve Johnson, a neighbor, 
had seen Plaintiff and Doug Young's bronze Ford Ranger at the home late on the night of July 25, 
2001/ early morning of July 26, 2001 (between midnight and 2:00 a.m.) (R.1871f26(b); R. Ex.37 
p. 13); (3) Leigh Hardy and Doug Young indicated the last time they were at the home was late 
July 24,2001/ early morning July 25,2001 to make sure it was locked (R. 1304:25:4-22; R.187 
10 
1|26(c); R. Ex.37); (4) a neighbor, Lt. Kent Demille, found the front door unlocked and saw flames 
coming from the front basement window east of the entry, but there was no fire in the rest of the 
home (R.187 Tf26(e); R. Ex.37); and (5) the dogs were in a run on the west side of the house. 
(R. 187 f 26(f); R. Ex.37.) 
Mr. Lyman did not see anything in the center of the room that could have provided a 
source of ignition. There was no TV or Nintendo in the center of the room. (R.1305:209:14-16; 
219:5-13, 14-20; 220:25; 221:1-2; R.1891f28(b).) He was aware the accelerant dog hit on an 
object in the center of the room and concluded that an accelerant was used. (R. 1305:222:24-25; 
223:1-3; 225:1-8; R.188 f28(a).) 
Based on his investigation, Mr. Lyman was of the opinion that the point of origin of the 
fire was in the center of the room of origin. (R.1305:208:23-25; 209:1-5; 219:5-13; R.188 
f 28(a).) This was later confirmed by the accelerant dog, who hit on an object in the center of the 
room, thought to be an accelerant. (R. 1305:243:4-12, 22-25; R.189128(a).) He also noted that no 
accidental source of ignition was found at the point of origin, indicating the fire was deliberately 
or intentionally set. (R. 1305:209:6-13; 219:14-20; R.189 f28(b).) Mr. Lyman testified that the 
fire was intentionally set by ruling out all potential accidental sources. (R. 1305:235:20-23; R.189 
128(c).) 
Because of the suspicious nature of the fire, Sandy City employee, Rex Nelson, and his 
accelerant dog were called to the scene. Both Mr. Nelson and his dog proceeded to the room of 
origin. They first went around the perimeter of the room, but there were no hits. He and the dog 
then worked back and forth through the center of the room. While doing so, the dog made an alert 
in the center of the room, confirming Mr. Lyman's finding that the point of origin was in the 
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center of the room. (R.1305:243:4-12, 22-25; R.188 f28(a).) The suspect sample was taken out 
of the room and placed on a plywood board. The dog again hit on the suspect sample, confirming 
the presence of an accelerant. (R.1305:245:8-16, 18-23; R.1921[34(e).) 
Initially, Luke Kneisler was assigned the claim. However, because of the suspicious 
nature of the claim, it was assigned to Scott Beebe, Defendant's Special Investigations Unit (SIU) 
investigator. Mr. Beebe noted that there were certain indicators that led to the assignment of the 
claim to SIU. These included financial status, the credibility of the plaintiff, the condition of the 
home, the lack of an accidental cause of the fire, and the potential use of an accelerant. 
(R.1304:100:13-22; 101:12-25; 102:1; R.192 f35; R.193 1(37.) 
After the fire occurred, feeling overwhelmed with the amount of personal property 
destroyed and/or damaged, Ms. Hardy retained Nathaniel Cook, a public adjuster, to prepare the 
inventories. She claims she did not assist in preparing those inventories or assessing the values, 
but she did review the content of the inventories and affixed her signature on the proof of loss. 
(R.1304:43:5-6, 9-15; 44:7-9; 48:8-18, 75:20-25; 76:1-3, 4-8; R.194 <ff40.) 
After doing his investigation, Mr. Cook submitted a proof of loss on the dwelling for 
$123,750. (R. 1304:45:24-25.) He also submitted a proof of loss for the personal property 
damage, claiming $74,2503 in contents. (R. 1304:46:2-6,13-14. ) 
Many items on the proof of loss were duplicate items. For example, there were 6 vacuum 
cleaners and repeated and extensive items of clothing such as mens, womens, boys and girls 
socks, sweaters, shirts, pants, shoes, etc. listed over and over again, without providing a 
description, not even a color or a brand name that would differentiate these articles of clothing. 
(R.1305:123:6-25; 124:4-17; 133:24-25; 134:1-2; 197^48.) 
12 
2. Facts Relating Only to the Bad Faith Partial Summary Judgment 
(a) Additional Background Information 
Mr. Young has been charged in the past with aggravated bank robbery, possession of drugs 
with intent to distribute, and aggravated burglary. (R.182 19.) Also, Shawn Elliott and Tim 
Hardy have criminal records. (R. 181 Tf7(b).) 
(b) Additional Pre-Fire Events 
There are no additional facts. 
(c) Additional Post-Fire Events 
Because of the suspicious nature of the fire, Detective Tim Berhow of the Sandy City 
Police Department was assigned to investigate the fire. (R.189 129.) In doing so, he spoke with 
and was provided with Richard Lyman's report and the July 13, 2001 report from the Sandy City 
Police Department. In addition, he spoke with Scott Beebe, Defendant's SIU investigator, various 
neighbors, Plaintiff and her husband, Doug Young, and Tim Hardy. He also contacted the Utah 
Housing Authority, the county treasurer's office, and visited the home. (R.189129.) 
In addition to the information provided him, Detective Berhow noted the following: (1) 
Leigh Hardy and Doug Young had retained counsel before learning anything about the origin of 
the fire. After being told there were suspicions of arson, Plaintiff became verbally combative. 
(R.189130(a)); (2) Scott Beebe advised that Plaintiff and Doug Young had told him they had been 
to the home in the early morning hours of July 26, 2001, and that she had locked the front door 
when she left. (R.190130(c)); (3) the next-door neighbors, the Shavers, indicated the dogs were 
in the outside kennel on the day of the fire. Normally, they are kept inside. (R. 190130(d)); (4) 
the home was in poor condition, the inside was filthy (trash, dog feces and garbage) and the 
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backyard was unkempt with weeds 2-3 feet high. (R.190 f 30(e)); (5) Plaintiff was uncooperative 
with all of the investigators in the case. When asked questions at any time regarding the house, 
she became verbally combative. In fact, she avoided talking to Detective Berhow by wrongfully 
claiming she was represented by counsel. (R.190 f 30(f)); (6) the antique dresser valued at $799 
which Plaintiff claims was destroyed matched the one in the garage which did not appear to have 
been damaged. (R.190 f 30(h)); (7) based on the photographs, many of the items Plaintiff listed as 
destroyed or damaged did not appear to be in the home, and did not depict over $100,000 of 
property Plaintiff claimed was in the home. (R.1911f30(i)); (8) information was obtained from 
informants, Richard Ricci (now deceased) and John Remington, that Plaintiff and Doug Young 
stated they had set the fire and that law enforcement would never be able to prove it. (R.191 
f30(j)); and (9) when advised she was being implicated with Doug Young for arson and insurance 
fraud, Plaintiff claimed it was John Remington's fault. (R.191 f30(k).) 
Initially, the claim was assigned to Luke Kneisler, a large loss property investigator, who 
primarily dealt with the inventory, proof of loss, and additional living expenses (ALE's). Mr. 
Kneisler retained John Blundell of Global Investigations to determine the cause and origin of the 
fire and, because of the suspicious circumstances, referred the file to Scott Beebe in Farmers' 
Special Investigation Unit. In addition, Mr. Kneisler authorized the taking of Leigh Hardy's 
sworn statement. (R.191 f31, 32.) 
After being retained by Defendant, Mr. Blundell visited the scene on July 27, 2001, the 
day after the fire. He spoke with several people including fire marshall Richard Lyman, took 
photographs, and prepared a scene diagram. He had available to him the lab report from Barker & 
Herbert analyzing the debris, the fire marshall's report, and scene diagrams of the various rooms 
14 
in the house. (R.192 Tf33.) Mr. BlundelPs investigation revealed that the house was in poor 
condition and that the fire originated in the southeast [sic, northeast] corner basement bedroom. 
After going through this bedroom with Plaintiff and looking at the burn patterns, he concluded 
that there were no appliances at the point of origin of the fire and, therefore, no accidental source 
of ignition. He concluded that the fire was intentionally set and may have been set with the use of 
a flammable accelerant. The Barker & Herbert lab report later revealed that the debris hit on by 
the accelerant dog contained a turpentine residue. (R.192 f33.) 
In the course of his investigation, Mr. Beebe looked into Plaintiffs financial history 
which included, but was not limited to, outstanding judgments and liens, a bankruptcy, the filing 
of other insurance claims, credit reports, employment history, and financial resources. In addition, 
he spoke to various neighbors, met with and obtained John Blundell's report, met with Leigh 
Hardy and Doug Young, met with Detective Berhow, spoke with and obtained the fire marshall's 
report, and spoke with and obtained the Sandy City Police Department report on the domestic 
abuse incident. (R.193f38.) 
He noted that the Hardy residence had a history of questionable living conditions and, had 
the fire not occurred, in all likelihood the home would have been closed to occupancy. The 
possibility also existed that Plaintiffs daughter, Breigh, would have been taken into protective 
custody. The Board of Health had made many attempts to contact Plaintiff to set up a meeting to 
inspect the home. Coincidentally, a meeting was finally set for the morning of the fire, but never 
took place because of the fire. (R.194 TJ39(c)(d).) The only source of income Plaintiff had was 
her disability check of approximately $300 per month. She had various outstanding judgments 
and tax liens. (R.194 P9(e).) The mortgage balance on the home was $45,456.96, and the tax 
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assessed value of the home was approximately $143,300. Her monthly payment was $696 which, 
pursuant to the divorce decree, her ex-husband, Brad Hardy, was paying. (R.194 TJ39(f).) Mr. 
Beebe also noted that, based on the reports of Richard Lyman and John Blundell, an ignition 
source could not be located. Also, according to Rex Nelson and his accelerant dog, the fire at the 
Hardy home was most likely started using an accelerant. (R.194 f 39(g).) 
3. Facts Relating Only to the Directed Verdict 
(a) Additional Background Information 
Doug Young, her husband at the time of the fire, had no finances or sources of income at 
all. Also, at some point, both her sons were on social security/ disability. Both she and Brad 
Hardy, her ex-husband, filed a bankruptcy in 1991. (R. 1304:60:21-23; 66:2-4; 82:4-6.) 
(b) Additional Pre-Fire Events 
Janet Sherwood, Plaintiffs friend, testified Plaintiff was remodeling the house and, for 
this reason, it was cluttered. Noteworthy, the last time she was in the home was in the spring of 
2001, which was 2-3 months prior to the fire. (R. 1305:167:19-22; 168:13-16; 171:2-5.) 
Also, it was noted that because of the condition of the home, Mr. Weinheimer made a 
referral to DCFS by faxing a copy of the Sandy City police report and his report to them. 
(R.1305:193:6-8; R. Ex.39; R. Ex.42.) 
Plaintiff stayed at the Travel Lodge for "quiet time" even though nobody else was living at 
the home at the time. (R. 1304:73:13-17.) In addition, Plaintiff indirectly acknowledged that her 
vehicle was at the scene when she testified, in response to questioning regarding this, that the 
vehicle belonged to a friend of Mr. Johnson's or that he could have mistaken the vehicle as being 
there on July 25th, not July 26th. (R.1304: 74:20-25; 75:1-8.) 
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(c) Additional Post-Fire Events 
Mr. Lyman also noted there was nothing in the room of origin indicating candles had been 
lit. He did not observe any evidence of burning or any wax residue. (R. 1305:220:21-24.) He did 
not see any evidence that the house was being remodeled. (R. 1305:221:3-5.) He was not sure 
what the object was that the dog hit on, initially thinking it was a transmission pan, which later 
turned out to be a computer part. (R.1305:225:25; 226:1-17; 227:8-12; 228:4-15.) Noteworthy, 
he never found a surge protector, candles or a TV in the room of origin. (R.1305: 230:8-16.) 
Mr. Lyman's opinion was later confirmed by Rex Nelson, the handler of the accelerant 
dog. Mr. Lyman had contacted Rex Nelson, also a cause and origin expert, and requested that he 
go to the scene with the accelerant dog on July 26, 2001. (R.1305:231:l-5; 249:5-8; 250:2-4.) 
After arriving at the scene, he calibrated the dog and took the dog into the room of origin. He 
worked the dog around the perimeter of the room. The dog did not make any alerts. 
(R. 1305:242:15-25; 243:1-2.) After going around the perimeter of the room, he and the dog 
worked back and forth through the center of the room. At that time, the dog made an alert in the 
center of the room, confirming Mr. Lyman's position that the point of origin was in the center of 
the room. (R. 1305:243:4-12, 22-25; R.188 t28(a).) The debris hit on by the dog was then 
removed from the room of origin and the dog was re-calibrated. (R. 1305:244:1-7, 16-25; 245: 1-
6.) The suspect sample was taken out of the room and placed on a plywood board. The dog again 
hit on the suspect sample, confirming the presence of an accelerant. (R. 1305:245:8-16,19, 23.) 
Because this residue could be independent, or exist in coniferous wood, Rex Nelson 
explained that the accelerant dog could distinguish between turpentine residues that were the 
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result of the burning of pine furniture or pine ceilings versus the existence of a chemical 
accelerant. (R. 1305:240:19-25.) 
To show the fire was allegedly accidentally set, Plaintiff called a friend of hers, Chris 
Johnson, an electrician. She specifically asked him to give her an opinion regarding an outlet in 
the room of origin that was melted and burned. However, because he had no forensic expertise, 
he was unable to determine whether the fire was electrically caused. (R.1305:181:ll-13,l7-22; 
182:1-8; 183:5-11.) 
Sometime later, Tim Hardy and his friend, Brandon Yates, told Plaintiff they had been in 
the house the night of the fire. (R.1305:142:3-9; 153:1-4.) Mr. Yates became involved with this 
litigation when he ran into Plaintiff at the 7-11 store. They were talking about Tim, and this gave 
rise to questions concerning the fire. (R.1305: 142:10-15.) Interestingly, Plaintiff gave him a ride 
to his deposition and also met hirn at Mr. Call's office for preparation for that deposition. 
(R.1305:142:19-21, 25; 143:1-3.) Also of interest, at the time Mr. Yates met with Mr. Call and 
Plaintiff, he could not remember the room, but somehow at the time of his deposition he was able 
to draw the room placing the furniture and electrical appliances. (R.1305:143:20-25; 144:10-18.) 
Mr. Yates claims that he, Tim and some other friends were in the house the evening of 
July 25, 2001, at approximately 10:00 p.m., smoking marijuana, drinking and playing games in 
the downstairs basement bedroom. (R.1305:137:22-25; 138:1-18; 22-25; 139:1-2.) He described 
two mattresses in the room, one on the floor and one on the bed. (R. 1305:139:9-10.) He was 
sitting in multiple spots playing video games and moving around the room. (R.1305: 139:3-13.) 
He remembers a fan in the room and a TV being on a stool in the center of the room. 
(R.1305:139:17-23.) The only other appliances in the room were a radio and a Nintendo. 
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(R.1305:139:24-25; 140:1.) He claims they lit 3-5 candles. There was a candle on the TV, 
another was on the dresser or entertainment center, and two were on a ledge. (R.1305: 140:4-12.) 
He claims they all left the house at approximately 1:00 a.m. (R.1305:140:23-25; 141:1-2.) 
Mr. Yates described the vehicle driven by Chad Smith, who was also at the home that 
night, as being similar to the vehicle driven by Doug Young, except that he described it as being a 
faded blue-silverish in color, not gold. (R.1305:145:12-13; 146:10-16.) Also, Mr. Yates recalls 
that, as they walked out of the room to leave the house, he told everybody to blow out the candles. 
He thought that they all walked home and left Chad Smith's vehicle there because they were too 
intoxicated to drive. (R.1305:145:16-17; 146:10-16.) Yet, there was no vehicle at the scene when 
the call was reported at 6:55 a.m. 
Tim Hardy, Plaintiffs son, also claims to have been at the home that evening. He testified 
that, the night before the fire, he was at his friend Mart's house where they were partying and 
playing video games, before deciding to go his mother's home. He then went with his friends to 
his mother's home where they drank alcohol, smoked marijuana and played Nintendo. He thought 
they went over there at 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. even though, according to his mother, he was with her at 
Lagoon at that time. (R.1305:149:12-18,20-25; 150:1-4.) He acknowledged lighting 4-5 candles 
and that they were smoking cigarettes and marijuana. (R.1305:150:16-24.) He also testified that 
the TV was on and they were playing video games. He could not recall if the stereo was on, but 
they listened to alot of music. (R.1305:150:25; 151:1-5.) 
He initially described one or two mattresses on the floor. He then testified that there was a 
mattress on the floor and one was on the bed frame, and then wasn't sure if there was more than 
one mattress. The TV was on a homemade stool that had been moved around the room that night, 
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so he was not sure where the TV was. (R. 1305:151:7-25; 152:1; 157:6-16.) He testified they 
were sitting on the mattress playing video games and smoking marijuana. (R. 1305:152:2-6.) 
When questioned about the date he was at the house, he could not remember testifying that he was 
at the house on July 24th and 25th and not in the early morning hours of July 26th. He then changed 
his testimony to say he was at the house in the early morning hours of July 25th. (R.1305:155:14-
17; 156:15-17.) Finally, he changed his testimony to say they were there the night of the fire, but 
he doesn't know the date. (R.1305:160:6-8.) 
When they left the home, he recalls telling Chad Smith to blow out the candles before he 
left the room, and was pretty sure that he did. (R.1305:157:20-25.) He testified a fan in the room 
was on part of the time, but doesn't know if it was on all of the time. He does not think the 
computer was plugged in. He thought there was a surge protector in the room but was not certain. 
(R.1305:158:13-16; 159:3-5,13-18.) 
Also of interest is that he testified they went to the house in Chad Smith's Ford Ranger, 
which looked similar to Doug Young's. They left the house between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. to go 
back to Matt's house. The next morning, he learned of the fire. (R.1305:152:10-23.) Even after 
he learned about the fire, he never told Plaintiff that he had been at the house. In fact, on 
questioning by the fire marshall, he denied this. (R. 1305:153:1 -4.) 
(d) Facts Pertaining to the Grant of the Motion for Directed Verdict 
At the time of the trial, Plaintiff designated her fire expert, Fred King, as a rebuttal 
witness, specifically stating: "I have my fire witness I am going to call in rebuttal to their experts." 
(R.1305:172:l-2; 253:10-12,18-19, 22-23; 254:1-8, 13-15; R. 1154.) Because Plaintiff 
designated her expert as a rebuttal witness, Defendant argued that Plaintiff could not use this 
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expert witness in her "case-in-chief," but only as a rebuttal witness at the close of Defendant's 
case. (R.1311:3-8; 1305:253:2-25; 254:1-15.) Prior to making this argument, the trial court was 
going to allow Mr. King to testify. (R.1311:3-8; 1305:178:2-25; 179:1-7; 252:8-25; 253:1.) 
Because Mr. King was not immediately available to testify, the trial court ordered Defendant to 
put on its witnesses. (R. 1305:176:18-20.) In fact, early in Plaintiffs case, when Plaintiff was 
without a witness, the trial court requested that if Defendant had any witness they be called out of 
turn, which occurred. (R. 1304:98:15-25; 99:1-4.) 
Subsequently, the trial court agreed with Defendant that because Plaintiffs expert had 
been designated as a rebuttal witness he could not testify in Plaintiffs "case-in-chief." (R.1311:3-
8.) As such, Defendant made a Motion for a Directed Verdict, which was granted on November 
30, 2006 and reduced to a judgment dated December 21, 2006, with the trial court finding that 
Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing that the fire was accidentally set, and that Plaintiff 
needed expert testimony to do so. (R.1209-1210; R.1221-1225.) 
Finally, in ruling in favor of Defendant on the Motion for Directed Verdict, the trial court, 
in its oral ruling, erroneously referred to U.R.C.P., Rule 41(b), even though this was a jury trial. 
This was corrected in the Judgment on Directed Verdict, which shows the Directed Verdict was 
granted based on U.R.C.P., Rule 50(a). (R.1209-1210; R.1221-1225.) 
Following the grant of the Directed Verdict, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial2 on 
January 2, 2007, alleging that Defendant had the burden of proving the fire was intentionally set. 
(R.1226-1228; R.1229-1233; R.1238-1250; R.1251-1260; R.1291-1294.) Further, Plaintiff 
argued that, even assuming she had the burden of showing the fire was accidentally set, she met 
this burden of proof by her own testimony, that an expert was not necessary, and also argued that 
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because the parties stipulated there was an insurance policy in effect at the time of the fire and the 
premiums were paid on that policy, that establishes her entitlement to coverage. (R. 1251-1260.) 
Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial was denied.2 (R. 1291-1293.) This appeal from the grant of the 
Motion for Directed Verdict and the denial of the Motion for a Newr Trial followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant maintains that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing the bad 
faith claim and the Directed Verdict were properly granted. Plaintiffs brief advanced nine 
arguments addressing these two issues. Because of the duplicity of Plaintiff s arguments, 
Defendant consolidated these arguments into three issues, bad faith, the directed verdict, and 
expert testimony. 
Bad Faith: First, with respect to the grant of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiff failed to identify this as an issue that was being appealed from in the Notice of Appeal. 
Because the purpose of the Notice of Appeal is to provide Defendant notice of specifically which 
judgment is being appealed from, the failure to do so renders the Notice of Appeal defective as to 
this issue. As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this issue. 
Assuming that the Court finds the Notice of Appeal sufficient, then it is Defendant's 
position that the grant of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing the bad faith claim 
was still appropriate. Defendant's claims adjuster and SIU personnel conducted extensive 
investigations. Those investigations support Defendant's position that this claim is "fairly 
debatable." Specifically, Defendant's investigation revealed that: (1) the home was in terrible 
condition and would have, in all likelihood, been closed to occupancy; (2) because of the 
condition of the home, Breigh Hardy could be taken into protective custody; (3) Plaintiff had no 
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financial means to remedy the condition of the home; (4) Plaintiff and her ex-husband had various 
outstanding liens, medical bills and judgments against them; (5) Mr. Weinheimer of the board of 
health made various attempts to meet with Plaintiff to discuss the condition of the home, with the 
meeting coincidentally taking place on July 26,2001, the day of the fire; (6) nobody was home at 
the time of the fire; (7) the dogs which were usually kept in the garage were outside at the time of 
the fire; (8) Plaintiff told Scott Beebe she was at the home in the early morning hours of July 26, 
2001, the day of the fire; (9) a witness, Steve Johnson, placed Plaintiffs vehicle at the home in the 
early morning hours of July 26,2001, the day of the fire; (10) Sandy City Fire Marshall Richard 
Lyman, Detective Berhow and Defendant's cause and origin expert, John Blundell, all concluded 
that the fire was intentionally set and that an accelerant had been used; (11) Detective Berhow had 
information from two informants that Plaintiff and Doug Young stated they had set the fire and 
that law enforcement would never be able to prove this; (12) Doug Young, who is a career 
criminal, and Plaintiffs sons, Tim Hardy and David Elliott, who also have criminal records, all 
had access and the means to commit arson; and (13) Plaintiff is claiming damages to the home of 
approximately $78,000 over the amount owed on the home. 
Finally, in addition to the Sandy City Fire Marshall, both of the experts retained by 
Defendant, Jay Freeman and John Blundell, determined there was no accidental cause for the fire 
and it was intentionally set. Clearly then, the above gives rise to legitimate factual issues 
regarding the validity of this claim. As such, Plaintiffs claim is "fairly debatable" as a matter of 
law, and partial summary judgment dismissing the claim for bad faith was appropriately granted 
and should be affirmed. 
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Directed Verdict: The court correctly ruled when it determined that Plaintiff had the 
burden of proving that she was wrongfully denied coverage by showing the fire was accidentally 
set. It is not until Plaintiff meets this burden that it shifts to Defendant to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Plaintiff intentionally set the fire or it was set at her direction. 
Metric Const. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2005 WL 2100939 (D.Utah 2005); Home 
Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 371 fii 7 (Utah App. 1991); Horrell v. 
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 909 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1996); LDS Hosp. a Div. of Intermountain 
Health Caret Inc. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988). 
Further, the court also ordered that for Plaintiff to meet this burden of showing the fire was 
accidentally set, it necessitated calling an expert witness, which Plaintiff failed to do. As such, 
she failed to sustain her burden of proof. Thus, the burden did not shift to Defendant to prove that 
the fire was intentionally set, and the Directed Verdict was appropriately granted. 
Clearly, "expert testimony is needed when the causative factors created by a breach of 
legal duty are outside the realm of common knowledge and experience of laypersons." King v. 
Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 862 (Utah 1992). In this instance, it is undisputed 
that to perform a cause and origin investigation, which would include looking at burn patterns, Ihe 
presence of accelerants, and determining the point of origin, is not within the province of 
laypersons. Having failed to offer expert testimony, the trial court appropriately found that 
Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof. 
Plaintiff also took issue with the appropriate time to make a motion for a directed verdict, 
arguing that it was not appropriate for Defendant to make this motion at the close of its case and 
that, by doing so, Defendant somehow waived the right to a directed verdict. First, it was at the 
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trial court's request that Defendant was told to put on its witnesses while waiting for Plaintiffs 
expert witness, Fred King. At the time Defendant made its Motion for Directed Verdict, it argued 
that Mr. King was designated as a rebuttal witness and, as such, he should not be allowed to 
testify in Plaintiffs "case-in-chief." The trial court ruled in Defendant's favor, finding Mr. King 
was in fact a rebuttal witness and, as such, could not testify in Plaintiffs "case in chief." Once 
that finding was made, Plaintiff had no further witnesses. As such, Plaintiffs case was rested and 
Defendant appropriately made its Motion for Directed Verdict and, further, did not waive the right 
to do so. 
Finally, when the trial court granted the Motion for Directed Verdict, it mistakenly 
referred to Rule 41(b). However, that was corrected on the actual Judgment on Directed Verdict, 
which reflects that the Directed Verdict was granted pursuant to Rule 50(a). 
Rebuttal Witness: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Mr. King to 
testify in Plaintiffs "case-in-chief." It is undisputed that Mr. King was designated as a rebuttal 
witness. This was not only admitted by Mr. Call the first day of trial, but he actually wrote it on a 
sheet of paper which he submitted to the trial court at its request. To allow Mr. King to testify in 
Plaintiffs "case-in-chief' is highly prejudicial. This is because Defendant was prepared to cross-
examine Plaintiffs expert as a rebuttal witness, not as to cause and origin. As such, the trial court 
properly excluded Plaintiff from allowing her rebuttal witness to testify in her "case-in-chief." 
Noteworthy, Plaintiff failed to proffer Mr. King's testimony as required by Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 103. Therefore, the Court is unable to determine whether an error has affected the 
substantial rights or was prejudicial to Plaintiff. As such, there is no basis to reverse the 
judgment. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1287 (Utah 1978). 
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Finally, the trial court ruled correctly in excluding Plaintiffs rebuttal witness' testimony at 
the close of Defendant's case. This is because once the court ruled on the Directed Verdict, 
finding Plaintiff had not sustained her burden of proving that the fire was accidentally set, there 
was no need for rebuttal testimony. Therefore, the Directed Verdict was appropriately granted 
and rebuttal testimony was unnecessary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DESIGNATE APPEAL, FROM THE GRANT OF 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE BAD FAITH CLAIM, 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THIS ARGUMENT 
The Notice of Appeal filed by Plaintiff shows her intention to appeal from the trial court's 
grant of the Motion for Directed Verdict in favor of Defendant and the denial of Plaintiff s Motion 
for a New Trial, but not the grant of Partial Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant dismissing 
the bad faith claim. As such, the Notice of Appeal, as to the bad faith claim, is defective. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency \ 
977 P.2d 474 (Utah 1999), a procedurally similar case. In Jensen, the trial court granted a partial 
summary judgment motion in defendant's favor, dismissing plaintiffs easement and water rights 
claims. The trial court conducted a jury trial on the remaining issue regarding flooding. The jury 
returned a verdict in favor of defendant, finding no negligence. Plaintiff moved for a judgment 
not withstanding the verdict and for a new trial. Both motions were denied and a final judgment 
was entered on August 10, 1995. Plaintiff then appealed. 
The notice of appeal did not state that plaintiff was appealing from the grant of 
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the easement amd water rights claims. As 
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such, defendant moved for summary disposition or, alternatively, to limit the scope of the appeal, 
arguing that the court did not have jurisdiction to review the partial summary judgment because 
plaintiff did not appeal from the judgment finalizing it. 
Referring to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3(d), the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that: "[t]he notice of appeal shall... designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, 
appealed from." The Supreme Court further held that Rule 3(d)'s requirement is jurisdictional. 
Id. 476. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that "the object of a notice of appeal is 
to advise the opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in a specific 
case. [Defendant] is entitled to know specifically which judgment is being appealed." Id. 476. 
The court found in favor of defendant, noting that plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial 
addressed only those claims that went to the jury, it did not include the easement and water rights 
claims that were addressed on partial summary judgment. The court also noted that defendant 
was prejudiced by plaintiffs failure to identify the appeal from the partial summary judgment 
motion. The court found the notice of appeal defective and that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
issue. 
In the present case, there is no relationship between the dismissal of the bad faith claim on 
partial summary judgment and the Directed Verdict granted on the breach of contract claim, such 
that Defendant was on notice that the bad faith claim was also being appealed. The Notice of 
Appeal identifies appeal from the Directed Verdict and denial of the Motion for a New Trial, 
neither of which address the bad faith claim. Thus, the Notice of Appeal is defective as to the bad 
faith claim and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review this claim. This is the case even if the 
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failure to identify appeal from the bad faith partial summary judgment did not prejudice 
Defendant. 
A. If the Notice of Appeal Was Sufficient Dismissal of Plaintiffs Claim for Bad Faith 
on Partial Summary Judgment Is Still Appropriate4 (Plaintiffs Argument I) 
The parties to any contract have parallel obligations to perform their contractual 
obligations in good faith. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). More 
specifically, the Utah Supreme Court explained the obligations of an insurer in a first-party 
context as follows: 
[T]he implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at the very least, 
that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether 
a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and 
reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. Id. at 801. 
See also Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., IAS P.2d 838, 842 (Utah App. 1987); Prince v. 
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 535 (Utah 2002); and Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 
918 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996). It follows then, "if an insurer acts reasonably in denying a claim, 
then the insurer did not contravene the covenant." Prince, Id. 533. 
As a matter of law, it is well established in Utah, "[i]f a claim brought by an insured against 
an insurer is fairly debatable, failure to comply with the insured's demands cannot form the 
4
 Plaintiffs brief, Argument Point I, fails to comply with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Rule 24(a)(9), which requires that the argument in the brief"... shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record 
relied on." Plaintiff has failed to cite to the record to support her position that partial summary judgment 
on the bad faith claim was wrongfully granted. As such, Plaintiff leaves it for this court to do so. 
Because Plaintiff has inadequately briefed this argument, it should be stricken. MacKay v. Hardy, 973 
P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1998); Beehive Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 89 P.3d 
131 (Utah 2004); Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197 (Utah App. 1996). 
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basis of bad faith." Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 133 P.3d 428 (Utah 2006) (emphasis 
added). See also Prince, supra and Callioux, supra. Where a claim is fairly debatable, "the 
insurer is entitled to debate it and cannot be held to have breached the implied covenant if it 
chooses to do so." Prince, Id. 533-534. 
Further, "if the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's validity, there 
exists a debatable reason for denial,... eliminating the bad faith claim . . . . A 'debatable reason,' 
for purposes of determining whether a first party insurer may be subjected to bad faith liability, 
means an arguable reason, a reason that is open to dispute or question." Prince, Id. 535. (Internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted.) 
In Callioux, supra, a factually similar case, Progressive's insured filed a claim for the loss 
of his vehicle as the result of a fire. Progressive hired an arson expert to investigate the claim, 
who concluded that the loss was of incendiary origin, occurring by or at the direction of the 
insured. Based on this, Progressive denied the claim. Progressive then reported its findings to the 
state fire marshall, who also determined it to be of incendiary origin. The fire marshall reported 
his findings to the Sevier County Attorney. Based on the state fire marshall's report and an 
independent investigation by the Sevier County Attorney's office, the insured was charged with 
arson and attempted insurance fraud. Ultimately, the insured was acquitted of these charges and 
the insurer paid the claim. Following the insured's acquittal, the insured filed a bad faith action 
against Progressive. Progressive filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the insured's 
claim was "fairly debatable" and, as such, there is no bad faith. Plaintiffs motion was granted. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that: 
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If the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's validity, there exists 
a debatable reason for denial, thereby legitimizing the denial of the claim, and 
eliminating the bad faith claim. "When a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is 
entitled to debate it, whether the debate concerns a matter of fact or law." Id. 842. 
In Prince, supra, the claimant was involved in an automobile accident for which he sought 
PIP benefits. After several weeks of treatment, the claimant submitted to an independent medical 
evaluation, and it was determined by this physician that further medical treatment was not 
necessary. As such, further claims for PIP benefits were denied. Because of this denial, the 
claimant filed a claim for breach of contract, bad faith, and assorted other causes of action. The 
insurer then filed for summary judgment maintaining that, based on the report of the independent 
medical physician, further PIP benefits were neither reasonable nor necessary, the standard used to 
determine whether to continue paying PIP benefits. Summary judgment was granted and the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed that the insurer's reliance on the opinion of an expert medical doctor that 
further medical care was unnecessary creating "a legitimate factual question regarding the validity 
of the insured's claim for benefits, making the insured's claim fairly debatable." Id. 535. As 
such, the denial of benefits did not constitute a "breach [of] the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing as a matter of law." Id. 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court in Billings, Id. 465, addressed whether a first party insurer 
could be held liable for breaching the implied covenant on the grounds that it wrongfully denied 
coverage if the insured's claim was later found to be proper. In addressing this issue, the court 
noted that if the insurer acted reasonably in dealing with the insureds, "it is entirely consistent... 
to hold that when an insured's claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it and 
cannot be held to have breached the implied covenant if it chooses to do so." Id. 465. 
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Defendant clearly met its good faith obligations under the Beck standards by diligently and 
fairly investigating the claim. Defendant's claims adjuster and SIU personnel conducted 
extensive investigations, which included: retaining a fire investigation firm; meeting with and 
gathering documents from the Sandy City Fire Marshall, the Sandy City Police Department, and 
the Sandy City Board of Health; gathering and confirming financial information; and meeting 
with various witnesses including the insured and her husband. That investigation supports 
Defendant's position that this claim is "fairly debatable." Specifically, Defendant's investigation 
revealed that: (1) prior to the fire, the home was in terrible condition and would, in all likelihood, 
have been closed to occupancy (R.183-184 f 13-19); (2) because of the state of the home, Breigh 
Hardy, the only child living in the home at the time, could be taken into protective custody (R. 
194 Tf39(c)); (3) Plaintiff had no financial means to remedy the condition of the home, her only 
source of income being $300 per month in SSI benefits (R.182 flO); (4) Plaintiff and her ex-
husband had various outstanding liens, medical bills and judgments against them (R.183 ^[11); (5) 
various attempts were made by Mr. Weinheimer of the board of health to meet with Plaintiff to 
discuss the condition of the home, with the resulting meeting coincidentally taking place on July 
26, 2001, the day of the fire (R.183-184 f 13-19); (6) nobody was home at the time of the fire -
Plaintiff and her husband were staying at the Travel Lodge and had been since July 21, 2001, Tim 
Hardy was at a friend's house, and Breigh Hardy was with her father (R.185 f20); (7) the dogs 
which were usually kept in the garage were outside at the time of the fire (R.190 ^f30(d)); (8) 
Plaintiff told Scott Beebe she was at the home in the early morning hours of July 26,2001, the day 
of the fire, to turn on the lights, open the windows for the swamp cooler, and turn on the 
oscillating fan in the bedroom, even though nobody was staying at the home (R. 186 f 24; R. 193 
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f39(b)); (9) a witness, Steve Johnson, placed Doug Young's truck at the home in the early 
morning hours of July 26,2001, the day of the fire (R.1871[26(b)); (10) Sandy City Fire Marshall 
Richard Lyman, Detective Berhow and Defendant's cause and origin expert, John Blundell, all 
concluded that the fire was intentionally set and that an accelerant had been used (R.186 f26; 
R.189 f 28(b)); (11) Detective Berhow had information from two informants that Plaintiff and 
Doug Young stated they had set the fire and that law enforcement would never be able to prove 
this (R.191 f30(j)); (12) Doug Young, a career criminal charged with aggravated bank robbery, 
possession of drugs with intent to distribute, and aggravated burglary, and Plaintiffs sons, Tim 
Hardy and David Elliott, who have criminal records, all had access and the means to commit 
arson (R.181 f7; R.182 f9); (13) Plaintiff claimed damages to the home in the amount of 
$123,750, approximately $78,000 over the amount owed on the home (R.180 f 1); (14) Plaintiffs 
limited financial means calls into question her proof of loss showing an extensive lost contents 
(R.197 f48); and (15) the duplicity of the items on the proof of loss and the lack of description, 
calling into question the values assigned to the items (R.197 f48.) 
Finally, in addition to the Sandy City Fire Marshall, both of the experts retained by 
Defendant, Jay Freeman and John Blundell, determined that there was no accidental cause for the 
fire and that it was intentionally set. Like Calliowc and Prince, the reliance on the fire experts 
alone supports Defendant's position that this was a "fairly debatable" claim. Both experts 
concluded the fire originated in the same location, that there was no ignition source in this 
location, an accelerant (turpentine) was likely used, and all possible electrical sources of ignition 
could be ruled out, resulting in their ultimate conclusion the fire was caused by arson. 
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Furthermore, Plaintiff had motive to commit arson given her financial means, the condition 
of the home just prior to the loss, the fact her daughter could be taken into protective custody, and 
no means to remedy the condition. Clearly then, the above gives rise to "legitimate factual 
questionfs] regarding the validity of the insured's claim for benefits, making the insured's claim at 
least fairly debatable." Prince, Id. 535. Therefore, because Plaintiff s claim was arguably "fairly 
debatable" under Utah law, partial summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs claim for bad faith 
was appropriately granted and should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT5 
(Plaintiffs Argument VII) 
The court ruled correctly when it determined that Plaintiff had the burden of proving that 
she was wrongfully denied coverage by showing the fire was accidentally set. It is not until 
Plaintiff meets this burden that the burden shifts to Defendant to show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Plaintiff intentionally set the fire or it was set at her direction. Metric Const Co. v. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., supra; Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., supra; 
Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., supra; LDSHosp. a Div. of Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., supra. 
The court further ruled that in order for Plaintiff to meet the burden of showing the fire was 
accidentally set, this necessitated calling an expert witness, which Plaintiff failed to do. 
5
 Plaintiffs brief fails to comply with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9) because 
she does not cite to the record and does not cite any case law supporting her position. Further, she has 
not shown there were factual issues for the jury. For the above reasons, this argument should be stricken. 
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Therefore, Plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proof. Thus, the burden did not shift to 
Defendant to prove that the fire was intentionally set, and the Directed Verdict was appropriately 
granted. Regardless, the evidence presented by Plaintiff at trial is clearly insufficient to set aside 
the Directed Verdict. 
For example, the testimony of Plaintiff, Brandon Yates, Tim Hardy and Chris Johnson does 
not establish the fire was accidental. Leigh Hardy testified as to various ways the fire may have 
occurred, such as a lightning storm which occurred approximately one month prior to the fire. 
(R. 1304:24:6-8, 24-25; 25:1.) She identified appliances in the room which included a TV, 
Nintendo 64, VCR, touch lamp, surge protector, computer, fan, and stereo, claiming they were all 
plugged in, to somehow suggest that they could have been a source of the fire. (R.1304:29:8-12, 
18-25; 30:2-6.) She identified the furniture in the room, with the purpose of showing that it was 
pine and that it could be the source of the turpentine accelerant that was found. (R.1304:30:9-12, 
25; 31:1-6, 24-25; 32:1-11.) Finally, she identified an outlet where she noticed that all the wires 
had melted together, all to point to other potential accidental sources of the fire. (R.1304: 56:13-
15). Noteworthy, Plaintiff never testified that she did not set the fire. 
Similarly, Brandon Yates offered testimony of possible causes of the fire. He identifies the 
furniture in the room, claiming there were two mattresses in the room, one on the floor and one on 
the bed, to suggest the possibility of a mattress fire. (R.1305:139:9-l 0.) He identifies the 
appliances in the room which included a TV, radio, Nintendo and fan. (R:1305:139:15-19, 24-25; 
140:1.) He describes lighting candles in the room and the placement of those candles throughout 
the room. He also identified two ashtrays that were moved around throughout the room. 
(R.1305:140:8-22.) All of the above was to establish possible sources of the fire. 
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Tim Hardy testified that 4-5 candles were lit, that he told another individual to blow out 
those candles, and he was pretty sure that they were in fact blown out. (R. 1305:150:16-24; 
151:14-15; 157:20-25.) He also testified that they were playing video games and the that the TV 
was on, but he could not remember if the stereo was on. He described two mattresses in the room. 
(R.1305:151:2-3,6-13,18-25; 152:1-6; 157:6-16.) He also testified the fan was on part of the 
time, he did not think the computer was plugged in, and he was not sure if there was a surge 
protector. (R.1305:158:13-16; 159:3-5,13-18.) Again, all of the above testimony was for the 
purpose of establishing an accidental source of the fire. 
Finally, Plaintiff called Chris Johnson, an electrician, who testified he is not a cause and 
origin expert and was not testifying as such. He indicated Plaintiff asked him to give an opinion 
regarding an outlet in the basement, specifically whether it was melted or burned. 
(R.1305:172:25; 173:1; 182:1-8,21-23.) Mr. Johnson described the wires as being melted and 
burned, but testified he could not determine whether the fire had an electrical cause. 
(R.1305:182:l-8, 18-20; 183:5-11.) 
The above testimony offers possible sources of the fire, but does not establish the fire was 
accidentally set. As such, the evidence provided would only allow a jury to speculate as to 
whether the fire was accidentally caused. For Plaintiff to establish the fire was accidentally 
caused, a cause and origin expert was necessary. Absent this expert testimony, Plaintiff fails to 
meet her burden of showing she was wrongfully denied coverage. Thus, the Directed Verdict was 
appropriately granted. 
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A. Plaintiff Has the Burden of Proving Her Loss Was a Covered Loss Under the Policy 
(Was Accidental) Before the Burden Shifts to Defendant to Raise any Exclusions as a 
Defense (Plaintiffs Argument HI) 
After Plaintiff put on her evidence (with the exception of her expert witness, Fred King) 
and Defendant put on its evidence, Defendant made a Motion for a Directed Verdict. The Court 
granted Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, finding that: 
. . . It is the allegation of the Plaintiff that she was wrongfully denied the 
opportunity to receive the money under the policy because the company had 
determined that the fire was intentionally set and, in all likelihood, by her or at her 
direction. 
Now, as an essential aspect of that claim, the burden then falls upon the 
Plaintiff to establish wrongful denial. And by virtue of that, it is upon the Plaintiff to 
establish that the fire was accidental and, indeed, it was not intentionally set. 
Otherwise, of course, all that is being presented here is allowing for speculation as to 
what occurred. And as part of the Plaintiffs case in chief, the Plaintiff must 
establish that the fire - at least present evidence that the fire was not intentionally set 
and, therefore, the denial of the claim was improper. And that Plaintiff has not done. 
The Plaintiff has rested without presenting expert testimony with regard to cause and 
origin. (R.1311:7:5-25.) See also Judgment (R. 1209-1210). 
Utah case law supports the position that Plaintiff has the burden of proving entitlement to 
insurance coverage by showing the fire was accidentally set. In Metric Const, Co, v. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins, Co., supra, the Federal District Court determined: "[T]he plaintiff has the burden 
of proving that [its] loss comes within the coverage stated in the policy. (Cites omitted.) . . . [If] 
plaintiff succeeds in establishing coverage, the burden then shifts to the insurer to raise any 
exclusions as a defense." Id, 2. See also Home Sav. and Loan v. Aetna Cas, and Sur. Co., supra. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court in LDSHosp., a Div. of Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc. v. Capital Life Ins. Co., supra, determined that: 
When an insured claims a right to recover under the accident provisions of the 
policy, all he need do is bring himself within the field therein defined and show his 
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injury or disability was proximately and predominantly caused through violent, 
external and accidental means. He then has brought himself within the policy, and 
the terms thereof have been met When he brings himself within the insuring 
clause he has made his case . . . and any exceptions or conditions which would then 
deny him relief, take him out of the indemnity provisions, render them inoperative as 
to him, are matters of defense, and the burden therefore rests upon the insurer.... 
Id. 859. 
Clearly then, Plaintiff has the burden of showing that she was wrongfully denied coverage by 
showing the fire was accidentally set, before the burden shifts to the Defendant to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff committed the intentional act of arson to preclude 
coverage. Metric Const. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., supra; Home Sav. and Loan v. 
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., supra; LDSHosp. a Div. of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Capitol 
Life Ins. Co., supra; and Horrell v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., supra. 
Plaintiff argues, wrongfully, that she has met this burden of proof just because she had an 
insurance policy in effect at the time of the fire and she had made all her premium payments. The 
parties stipulated that the policy was in effect at the time of this loss. However, they never 
stipulated that, because there was a policy in effect at the time of the loss, Plaintiff was entitled to 
payment, the subject of this very lawsuit. (R. 1304:23:5-23.) 
Plaintiff supports her position by citing to Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 453 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah 
1969) and Peterson v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 425 P.2d 769 (Utah 1967), for the proposition 
that receipt of the premiums on the policy establishes the prima facie liability of the insurance 
company to make payments. If this were the case, then an insured would only have to show there 
was a policy in effect and the premiums were current, and there would be entitlement to payment 
under that policy. 
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Fox v. Allstate, supra, does not address this issue, that is that having a policy in effect and 
payment of the premiums establishes prima facie liability. Rather, this case involved whether the 
sinking of a boat actually occurred when the insured failed to produce evidence of proof of 
ownership or any evidence that the boat had in fact sunk. The issue addressed by the court was 
whether summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was appropriate based on his affidavit. In 
reversing summary judgment, the court determined that plaintiff had not shown proof of ownership 
or loss to warrant summary judgment. Thus, the court found there was an issue of fact to be tried 
by the jury. This case does not stand for the proposition that, because there was a policy of 
insurance in place at the time, this automatically entitled the plaintiff to payment of the policy 
benefits. 
Peterson v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., supra, is also distinguishable. First, Petersen 
involved a third-party claim, not a first-party claim. Also, Petersen involved a summary judgment 
entered against defendant insurer. Defendant insurer then sought to overturn the judgment by 
arguing that the insured failed to cooperate and, as such, summary judgment was not appropriate. 
The court determined it was not persuaded that defendant had used the degree of diligence 
necessary to locate the insured. As such, the judgment stood and the insured was required to pay 
that judgment. This case does not stand for the proposition that merely having a policy in effect at 
the time and premiums current entitles the individual to payment under the policy. 
It follows then that, in order to sustain her burden of proof, Plaintiff needed to prove that 
the fire was accidentally set, and having failed to do so, did not meet this burden. Therefore, the 
Directed Verdict was appropriately granted. 
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B. Plaintiff Has the Burden of Putting on Expert Testimony to Show That the Fire Was 
Accidentally Set (Plaintiffs Argument IV) 
The Court ruled correctly in determining that Plaintiff had the burden of putting on expert 
testimony to show that the fire was accidentally set. In Utah, the law is clear, when the 
information sought is not within the common knowledge of laypersons, then the party must 
introduce expert testimony to establish this. The failure to do so allows the jury to wrongfully 
speculate as to the causation. Walker v. Parish Chemical Co., 914 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 
1996); King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra; Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 
1980); Preston & Chambers, PC. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah App. 1997). 
In the present case, Plaintiff failed to put on any testimony from a cause and origin expert to 
establish that the fire was accidentally set. Clearly, expert testimony is needed to evaluate burn 
patterns, establish the point of origin, determine the type of accelerant, and generally perform an 
investigation of the cause and origin of a fire. It is not within the province of laypersons to do so. 
As such, it was necessary for Plaintiffs counsel to have the testimony of a fire expert. 
Walker v. Parish Chemical Co., supra, was a case involving the cause and origin of a fire 
and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Even though the current case does not involve this doctrine, 
the principles and holding in this case are applicable. In Walker, a fire broke out on the premises. 
Rather than extinguish the fire, the firefighters let it burn. As a result, the plaintiff, a bystander, 
was injured. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Parish Chemical, alleging her injuries were the result 
of the company's negligence. She proceeded under a theory of res ipsa loquitur because she 
could not point to a specific negligent act that the chemical company committed, and hoped to 
establish the accident was the kind that would not occur absent negligence. 
39 
Plaintiff called three witnesses who agreed on the location of where the fire started, but 
only speculated about the cause and origin of that fire. Parish Chemical moved for a directed 
verdict, but the court allowed the case to go to the jury and gave the res ipsa loquitur instruction. 
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, finding Parish Chemical negligent. After the verdict, 
Parish Chemical moved the trial court for a JNOV, arguing that plaintiff had failed to establish the 
necessary foundation for the res ipsa instruction, contending that she had not shown the fire was 
more probable than not the result of Parish Chemical's negligence. The trial court ruled that 
Parish Chemical was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff had not introduced 
sufficient evidence to establish the necessary foundation for the res ipsa loquitur instruction, 
specifically that there " . . . be a basis either in common knowledge or expert testimony that when 
such an accident occurs it is more probable than not the result of negligence." 
In essence, like the present case, the plaintiff in Walker did not present any expert 
testimony, but instead called three witnesses who speculated about the possible causes of the fire, 
but none offered an expert opinion about the cause. The court determined plaintiff must present 
sufficient evidence to show that a particular accident at issue was more likely the result of 
negligence. In concluding this, the court stated: 
[a]s long as the conclusion is a matter of mere speculation or conjecture, or where 
the probabilities are at best evenly balanced between negligence and its absence, it 
becomes the duty of the court to direct the jury that the burden of proof has not been 
sustained. Id. 1163. 
Because Walker relied on speculation and conjecture, the trial court concluded appropriately she 
was not entitled to a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur and correctly ruled Parish Chemical was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, a products 
liability case, addressed the circumstances when expert testimony is necessary, rather than relying 
on the experience of laypersons. King, supra was an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of 
the pharmaceutical company and against plaintiff on her claims based on strict liability and 
negligence. The trial court ruled that plaintiff failed to show a material issue of fact to preclude 
summary judgment on whether the pharmaceutical company caused the alleged injury. Plaintiff 
argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur established a prima facie case of liability against Searle and, therefore, raised a material 
issue of fact as to causation with respect to both claims against Searle. 
The product at issue was the CU-7 intrauterine device (IUD), in which there were 
allegations that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous. On this issue, the 
pharmaceutical company filed a motion for summary judgment supported by the affidavit from a 
gynecologist who had examined the plaintiff and reviewed her medical records, and concluded 
that the IUD was neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous and that plaintiffs injuries were 
not caused by any negligence or fault on the part of the pharmaceutical company. 
Plaintiff opposed this motion by filing the affidavit of Robert Baier, Ph.D. Dr. Baier's 
affidavit was based on laboratory studies he performed on animal tissue and his conclusion that 
the CU-7 was "an inherently dangerous device inappropriate for implantation in the female 
uterus." The court granted the pharmaceutical company's motion for summary judgment, noting 
that Dr. Baier had not examined plaintiff or any of her medical records and did not know any of 
the particular facts concerning the complication at issue. As such, his affidavit failed to raise a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether the CU-7 was the cause of plaintiff s injury. Id. 861. 
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The issue on appeal was whether plaintiff had established a factual dispute as to the cause 
of her injury. In order to bridge the factual gap as to causation, she raised the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. On appeal, plaintiff conceded that Dr. Baier's affidavit did not create a factual issue as 
to whether the CU-7 was the cause of her injuries. As such, she maintained that it was unfair to 
require her to put on direct evidence of causation because it was impossible to do so and, hence, 
relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
In analyzing ordinary res ipsa loquitur cases, the court noted that the foundation from 
which a logical conclusion "can be drawn that an injury was probably caused by negligence is the 
common knowledge and experience of the community with respect to how such events generally 
occur." Id. 862. The court also noted, however, that: 
In some kinds of cases, however, the circumstances giving rise to the injury and the 
probabilities that the causative factors were created by a breach of legal duty are 
outside the realm of the common knowledge and experience of lay persons. Even so, 
occasionally the state of the art or technology causing an injury may pass from the 
realm of expert evidence into the realm of common knowledge and experience. Id. 
862. 
Thus, the court concluded that: "[W]hen the circumstances and the probabilities as to the 
cause of the factors of an accident lie within the ken of experts, expert evidence is necessary to 
establish a foundation that gives rise to an inference of negligence." Id. 862. The court concluded 
then that, given the defendant's expert's affidavit, an inference of the pharmaceutical company's 
liability could not be deduced from common experience and knowledge. Id. 864. 
In Nixdorf, supra, a medical malpractice case, the Utah Supreme Court determined: 
The plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish [the! standard of care. 
Expert testimony is required because the nature of the profession removes the 
particularities of its practice from the knowledge and understanding of the average 
citizen. Id. 352. 
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In stating the majority rule, the court also recognized that there were certain exceptions to 
this general rule requiring expert testimony. In this regard, the court noted: 
. . . Specifically, expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the standard of care 
owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is within the 
common knowledge and experience of the layman. The loss of a surgical instrument 
or other paraphernalia, in the operating room, exemplifies this type of treatment. Id. 
352. 
In explaining this, the court made a distinction between the loss of instruments or 
paraphernalia, which is within the general common knowledge of a layperson that negligence 
occurred, versus whether a surgical operation was skillfully or unskiUfuUy performed as not being 
within the province of the jury. 
The same standard regarding expert witness testimony applied in a legal malpractice case. 
In Preston & Chambers, P.C., supra, the court determined that an expert was required, noting 
that: 
Utah courts have held that expert testimony may be helpful, and in some cases 
necessary, in establishing the standard of care required in cases dealing with the 
duties owed by a particular profession.... Expert testimony is required "[w]here 
the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or 
professions" as in cases involving medical doctors, architects and engineers. (Cites 
omitted.) Expert testimony may also be required to establish the duties owed by 
practicing attorneys to their clients, especially in cases involving complex and 
involved allegations of malpractice. Id. 263. 
In this case, clearly, the cause and origin of a fire is not within the general background and 
common knowledge of laypersons. Therefore, the Court correctly ruled that it was necessary for 
Plaintiff to put on expert testimony to show the fire was accidentally set. Therefore, the Directed 
Verdict should be affirmed. 
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C. It Was Appropriate for Defendant to Make its Motion for Directed Verdict at the 
Close of its Case6 (Plaintiffs Argument VIII) 
In order to move the matter forward, the trial court requested that Defendant put on its case 
and, at the conclusion of evidence, allowed Defendant to move for a Directed Verdict. (R.1305: 
176:9-20; 183:12-19; 253:2-13.) At the time Defendant made its Motion for Directed Verdict, it 
argued that Mr. King was designated as a rebuttal witness and, as such, he should not be allowed 
to testify in Plaintiff s "case-in-chief." (R. 1305:253:22-25; 254:1-15; R. 1154.) The trial court 
ruled in Defendant's favor, finding that Mr. King was a rebuttal witness and, as such, could not 
testify in Plaintiffs "case-in-chief." Therefore, once the trial court made that finding, Plaintiff 
had no more witnesses and essentially rested her case. Therefore, Defendant appropriately made 
its Motion for Directed Verdict. U.R.C.P., Rule 50(a), provides: 
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an 
opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without 
having reserved the right to do so to the same extent as if the motion had not been 
made. . . . 
In this case, Defendant did move for a directed verdict at the close of Plaintiff s evidence. 
Once it was decided that Mr. King could not testify, Plaintiff had no further witnesses, so the 
Motion for Directed Verdict was appropriately made. Regardless, there are Utah cases where the 
court has requested to hear both plaintiffs and defendant's evidence before allowing a motion for 
directed verdict. Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad., 31 P.3d 557 (Utah 2001); 
Carlson Distributing Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C, supra. 
6
 Plaintiffs brief fails to comply with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9), in that 
Plaintiff does not cite to any case law to support her position, nor does she cite to the record. As such, 
this argument should be stricken as well. 
44 
Clearly then, Defendant made its Motion for Directed Verdict at the appropriate time, at the 
close of Plaintiff s case. 
(i) Defendant Did Not Waive its Right to a Directed Verdict by Putting on its Case1 
(Plaintiffs Argument VI) 
Plaintiff also argues, for the first time that, because Defendant put on its case, somehow it 
now waives its right to a directed verdict. Regardless, for all the reasons discussed above under 
Point C, there is no waiver. 
In support of her position, Plaintiff relies on State v. Stockton, 310 P.2d 398 (Utah 1957). 
However, Plaintiffs reliance on Stockton is misplaced because it does not stand for the 
proposition that if defendant fails to seek a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff s case, then it 
somehow waives the right to do so. In fact, not only is this not the law as indicated in Stockton, 
but the case is factually distinguishable. 
Stockton was a criminal matter where, at the close of the prosecution's case, defendant 
made a motion for directed verdict, which was subsequently denied. Rather than rest, after the 
motion for directed verdict was denied, defendant elected to move forward and put on additional 
evidence. At the close of defendant's case, the jury found defendant guilty. The appellate court 
found that the denial of defendant's motion for directed verdict was appropriate. The court also 
found that, because defendant elected to put on his defense, he then made all the testimony 
available to the jury for its final consideration. However, what is distinguishable in that case is 
that the evidence put on by the defendant did not affect the court's initial decision to sustain the 
7
 This issue has not been preserved on appeal and, therefore, this Court should not address it. 
Plaintiffs brief, Argument, Point VI, fails to comply with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 
24(a)(9) which requires that the plaintiff specifically cite to the record, which Plaintiff has not done. As 
such, this argument should be stricken. (See cites under Argument I, Footnote 4.) 
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conviction. Stockton clearly does not stand for the proposition that if defendant moves forward 
with its case, then it cannot make a motion for directed verdict. Because the trial court requested 
that Defendant put on its case while waiting for Plaintiffs expert, this does not give rise to a 
waiver of Defendant's right to a directed verdict. Plaintiff has cited to no case law to support that 
position. 
It follows then that Defendant appropriately made its Motion for Directed Verdict at the 
close of Plaintiff s case and did not waive its right to do so by putting on its evidence. As such, 
the Directed Verdict should be affirmed. 
D. Did the Court Err in Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict Pursuant to 
Rule 4Kb) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? (Plaintiff s Argument IX) 
Initially, the court mistakenly ordered the directed verdict pursuant to U.R.C.P., Rule 41(b). 
However, that error was corrected in the actual Judgment on Directed Verdict, which reflects that 
the Directed Verdict was granted pursuant to Rule 50(a). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED 
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL WITNESS FROM TESTIFYING IN HER "CASE-IN-CHIEF" 
(Plaintiffs Argument II) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Mr. King, Plaintiffs expert, to 
testify in her "case-in-chief." Mr. King was designated as a rebuttal witness. Mr. Call clearly 
admitted this the first day of trial where he submitted this designation on a sheet of paper, at the 
Court's request. (R. 1311:8:1-4; R. 1154.) Again, during the trial, Mr. Call specifically stated he 
was calling Mr. King as a rebuttal witness. (R. 1305:172:1 -2.) Defendant relied on Plaintiffs 
representations in preparing the cross-examination that Mr. King was a rebuttal witness and was 
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prepared to cross-examine him as only a rebuttal witness. To have allowed Plaintiffs expert to 
testify in her "case-in-chief' would have been highly prejudicial to Defendant. 
The purpose of rebuttal evidence is "tending to refute, modify, explain or otherwise 
minimize or nullify the effect of an opponent's evidence." Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329,1338 
(Utah 1993). See also Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Utah App. 1998), wherein it states the 
"purpose of rebuttal evidence is not to merely contradict or corroborate evidence already 
presented, but to respond to new points or evidence first introduced by opposing party." Id. 1086. 
The purpose then is to allow Plaintiffs expert to respond to issues raised by Defendant's 
witnesses, not for Plaintiffs expert to give his opinion as to the cause and origin of the fire. To 
find otherwise is an unfair surprise to Defendant and is highly prejudicial. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994) for the proposition that 
the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing her expert to testify in her "case-in-chief' is 
misplaced. The facts in Turner are clearly distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case sought 
the testimony of an undisclosed rebuttal witness who was going to be called during trial to testify 
as to a reasonably anticipated defense. The testimony was excluded because it would unfairly 
disadvantage the defendant, who had no notice of or opportunity to depose the surprise witness. 
Turner, Id, 1023. The principle in Turner is, however, applicable to this case; that is that it would 
unfairly prejudice Defendant if Mr. King were allowed to testify the fire was accidentally set 
without giving the Defendant the opportunity to prepare for this testimony. Clearly then, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Plaintiffs expert to testify. 
More importantly, because Plaintiff did not comply with the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 
103(a), this Court has no basis to determine whether the testimony of Mr. King was erroneously 
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excluded. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a), provides: " . . . [ejrror may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected." For Plaintiff to comply with this rule, she needed to proffer Mr. King's testimony. 
This is the only way the Court can determine whether Plaintiffs "substantial rights" have been 
impacted. That is, had Mr. King been allowed to testify, the outcome would have been different. 
City of Hildale v. Cooke, 28 P.3d 697, 705 (Utah 2001); Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakney 
Corp., supra. Absent this proffered testimony, there is no way for this Court to determine 
whether the trial court's ruling was "prejudicial." Therefore, "a judgment will not be reversed for 
alleged error in the exclusion of evidence unless it appears in the record that the error was 
prejudicial." Downey, Id. 1287. Because Plaintiff failed to proffer what her evidence would 
show, she is precluded from asserting on appeal that the exclusion of this evidence was an error.8 
A. The Court Correctly Ruled in Excluding Plaintiffs Rebuttal Witness's Testimony at 
the Close of Defendant's Case (Plaintiffs Argument V) 
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to rebut Defendant's testimony, which may be true; 
however, under the facts of this case there is no need for rebuttal testimony. Because Plaintiff did 
not meet her burden of proof showing that she was wrongfully denied coverage, by showing the 
fire was accidentally set, the Directed Verdict was appropriately granted and rebuttal testimony 
was unnecessary. 
Note that Plaintiff cites to testimony from Mr. King's report on page 32, fl8 of her brief, when 
neither his report nor any of the testimony she cites at this section is part of the record. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court affirm both the grant of the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment dismissing the bad faith claim, as well as the Directed Verdict. 
Defendant also requests that this Court find that the Notice of Appeal was defective and that 
Plaintiff has now waived the right to appeal from the grant of the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Finally, Defendant requests that the Court find that Plaintiff has waived the right to 
appeal from the Motion for New Trial (which was not briefed) and that Plaintiffs Arguments, 
Point I, VI, VII, and VDI, all be stricken for failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9). 
DATED this 2/ W of August, 2007. 
Barbara L. Maw 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2-1 Hay of August, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Budge W. Call 
8 East Broadway, Suite 720 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9): 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds 
for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request 
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3(d): 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part 
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; 
and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4Kb): 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in 
an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his 
evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the 
motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts 
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts 
may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline 
to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as 
provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in 
this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for 
lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50(a): 
Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves for a 
directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer 
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved the 
right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion 
for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even 
though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a 
directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The order of the court 
granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a): 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and . . 
